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1. INTRODUCTION 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONl 
Louis L. Wilde 
Several years ago Philip Nelson observed that certain problems 
arise in extending search theory to deal with nonhomogeneous goods. 
In particular, he noted that "(i]nformation about quality differs from 
information about price because the former is usually more expensive 
to buy than the latter" (1970, p. 311]. To analyze the implications 
of this observation, Nelson divided goods into two classes, search 
goods and experience goods. Search goods are those for which utility 
is assessed before purchase by actual inspection. Experience goods are 
those for which utility is assessed after purchase by actual consumption. 
These definitions turn out to be very strong. So strong, in 
fact, that they lead to some difficulties. Consider, for example, 
experience goods. For these goods utility is assessed after purchase 
by actual consumption. But at least the price is observed before 
purchase. Since for experience goods this cannot, by definition, 
affect the choice of which brand to buy, Nelson was forced to assume that 
"consumers either sample at random from among all brands or from among 
those brands in the price range the consumer deems appropriate for 
himself" (1970, p. 313]. These assumptions require that consumers 
either ignore prices completely or have perfect information regarding 
prices, neither of which seems likely. 
2 
The problem with Nelson's definitions is that goods generally 
possess a number of characteristics which can differ in their degree of 
observability. Thus a good might possess some "search" characteristics 
and some "experience" characteristics. Furthermore, whether a particular 
characteristic is a search characteristic or an experience characteristic 
ought to be endogenously determined by the consumer. 
In Wilde (1977] I analyze a model in which goods are described 
by precisely two characteristics, price and quality. The market distri-
'bution of price and quality is given by a joint p.d.f,, rjl(p, q), The cost 
of drawing a sample of one from rjJ is given by cs , where cs "". 0, Once an 
observation is drawn from rjl, price is observed costlessly, Quality, 
,however, can never be observed before purchase, In this case quality is
an extreme example of an experience characteristic, one for which the 
cost of observation prior to purchase is infinite. The present paper 
extends this model to allow quality to be observed at some finite 
cost, cT, where cT"".O. The purpose of the exercise is to explicate the
relationships between information costs, duration of search, and turn-
2 over. 
The model developed in Wilde (1977] applies to a number of 
cases discussed by Nelson. For example, it formalizes his prototypic 
experience good, canned tuna fish. Nelson suggested that "(t]o evaluate 
brands of canned tuna fish, the consumer would almost certainly purchase 
brands of tuna fish for consumption. He could, then, determine from 
several purchases which brand he preferred, For tuna fish there is 
no effective search alternative open. At the low price of experience, 
there is insufficient demand for specialized establishments selling 
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tastes of various brands of tuna fish" [1970, p. 312]. In this case,
Nelson seems to be suggesting that the "price of experience" is low 
because the price of the good is low. However, the price of experience 
can be low for other reasons as well. For example, if there is little 
variance in quality then the price of experience is low because there 
is little chance of purchasing a low-quality good. In fact, it will 
turn out that by allowing quality to be observed before purchase, at 
some cost, an explicit expression for the price of experience can be 
derived. Utilizing this expression, this paper will also explicate the 
relationship between information costs and the price of experience. 
The focus of the model developed in section 2 is again on an 
imperfectly informed consumer who is interested in maintaining a one unit 
per period flow of consumption of a good which is described by price 
and quality. The market offers various combinations of price and 
quality but the consumer cannot costlessly observe them; by paying a 
search cost the consumer can sample a good from the market, but only 
price is observed. Quality can be observed either before purchase by 
actual inspection (at some additional cost) or after purchase by 
actual consumption. Whether quality is observed before purchase 
(herein called inspection) or after purchase (herein called 
evaluation), the consumer can return to the market and resample if 
the observed quality level is too low. The initial problem is to 
characterize the optimal strategy for a consumer in such an 
environment. For a fixed utility function, joint distribution of 
price and quality, and cost of search, three possibilities arise 
depending on the cost of inspection: 
(1) If the cost of inspection is low enough, inspection 
will be the optimal strategy for low prices and 
drawing a new observation will be the optimal 
strategy for high prices. 
(2) If the cost of inspection is of an intermediate amount, 
evaluation will be the optimal strategy for low prices, 
inspection will be the optimal strategy for intermediate 
prices, and drawing a new observation will be the 
optimal strategy for high prices. 
(3) If the cost of inspection is high enough, evaluation 
will be the optimal strategy for low prices and 
drawing a new observation will be the optimal strategy 
for high prices. 
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The formal results of the paper relate to the characterization 
of the consumer's optimal strategy which is summarized by (1)-(3) above. 
However, these results have broad implications. Three important 
observations emerge from the analysis. 
First, as mentioned above, the price of experience can be 
defined analytically. This is important because it allows one to 
differentiate between the direct, short-run benefits of purchasing a 
good which are derived from its consumption and the indirect, long-run 
benefits of purchasing a good which are derived from evaluation of 
its quality attributes. 
Second, it will be demonstrated that in some cases quality 
will be a pure search characteristic (#1 above), in some cases it will 
be neither a pure search characteristic nor a pure experience 
characteristic (#2 above), and in some cases it will be a pure 
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experience characteristic (#3 above). Hence, not only is determining 
whether a particular good is an experience good or a search good a 
complex matter, but so is determining whether a particular characteristic 
of that good is an experience characteristic or a search characteristic. 
Since these distinctions have become very popular in the literature it 
is important to understand their limitations. 
Finally, the comparative statics associated with the 
characterization of the consumer's optimal strategy will show that the 
theoretical foundations of much of the empirical work on duration of 
search and turnover in labor markets and marriage markets is unsound. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
basic model. Section 3 considers the case in which quality is always 
observed before purchase, section 4 considers the case in which quality 
is observed before purchase for some prices but is observed after 
purchase for other prices, and section 5 considers the case in which 
quality is always observed after purchase. Section 6 discusses the 
empirical implications of the model in the labor market and the 
marriage market. Section 7 provides a brief conclusion. 
2. THE MODEL: NOTATION, DEFINITIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In this section the basic model will be developed and an 
explicit expression for the price of experience given. Sections 3, 4 
and 5 provide comparative statics for the three cases mentioned in 
the introduction. 
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Assume the good which is sought by the consumer has a lifetime 
of one period. Let U(p, q) be the total net value to the consumer of 
purchasing and consuming the good characterized by price p and quality q, 
where U is differentiable and bounded on R+ x R+ with au/ap < 0 and
au/aq > 0. Let ¢(p, q) be the consumer's subjective estimate of the
market density of P and Q. For mathematical convenience, assume ¢ 
is strictly positive on R+ xR+. Define f(p) as the marginal density 
of P and g(q j p) as the conditional density of Q given P=p, both 
based on ¢. 
The cost of drawing an observation at random from¢ is cs , 
where cs :': 0. The cost of observing the true value of Q prior to 
purchase is cT, where cT =:: 0 (both cs and cT are measured in the same 
units as U). 
The consumer can sample as many observations as desired from 
¢ at the beginning of each period. Any number of inspections are also 
allowed. However, the consumer demands precisely one unit of the good 
each period. Search and inspection are assumed to be timeless in order 
to avoid confounding the direct costs of these activities with the 
opportunity cost of delaying the purchase decision. 
The consumer's objective is to maximize expected discounted 
utility of consumption net of search costs. Sampling is assumed to be 
without recall, the horizon is infinite and the discount rate is S, 
where 0 < S <l. 
Now suppose the consumer has drawn an observation of p from 
f, Three reactions are possible: sample again without observing 
quality; inspect quality and then either buy the good forever or 
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sample again; or evaluate quality and then either buy the good forever 
or sample again. Let v(p) be the expected value of drawing an 
observation of p and then proceding optimally. By the principle of 
optimality, 
v(p) = -cs + max{V,B(p),T(p)}, 
where V is the expected value of v(p) taken with respect to f, B(p) 
is the expected value of buying the good without observing quality 
and then proceding optimally, and T(p) is the expected value of 
testing quality prior to purchasing the good and then proceding 
optimally. 
To analyze (1), observe first that once quality ts known, 
the value of the optimal policy is the same whether quality is 
observed via inspection or evaluation, Define this value as k(p). 
Then 
00 
k(p) VG[q*(p) j p] + J Uip_,�) g(q j p)dq
q*(p) 
(1) 
(2) 
where q*(p) is that quality level which makes the consumer indifferent 
between consuming the good characterized by {p,q*(p)} and searching 
again for a new good from t. That is, q*(p) is defined by
U(p,q*(p)) V(l-f3). 
The logic of (2) is that if q < q*(p), then the consumer rejects the
good and samples again. This happens with probability G[q*(p) J p].
If q".'.q*(p), then the good is acceptable and the consumer receives 
3 the conditional expected value of U(p,q)/(1-f3), given q ".'. q*(p). 
Using k(p), both B(p) and T(p) are defined straight-
forwardly: 
B(p) EU(p,Q) + f3k(p) 
T(p) = -cT + k(p). 
It is convenient at this point to assume that the 
functional equation (1) has a unique, bounded solution. In this 
case V is unique and well-defined.4 
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In analyzing the optimal policy it will also be convenient 
to make a transformation of variables in the definition of k(p). 
Since it is ultimately final utility which matters to the consumer, 
the focus of (2) can be shifted from the conditional distribution of
quality given price to the conditional distribution of utility 
given price. That is, let �(w j p) be the conditional distribution of
utility given P=p. Then k(p) becomes 
where �(p) 
°;(p) 
k(p) vnvcl -f3) J pJ + J 1: 6 wcw J p)dw 
V(l -f3) 
lim U( p ,q), Integrating (5) by parts gives 
q +oo 
k(p) 
z(p) 
(1-f3)-l[�(p) - J �(w j p)dw], 
V(l -f3) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Finally, noting that B(p) can be rewritten as 
B(p) = -cB(p) + k(p) 
where 
cB(p) = (1- S)k(p) - EU(p,Q), 
one can see that cB(p) is the implicit cost of o bserving quality by 
actual consumption. Using (S) it is easy to show that 
V(l - S) 
cB(p) = ��(w jp)dw,
z(p) 
where z(p) = U(p, O). 
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Equation (8) provides an analytical expression for Nelson's 
(7) 
(8) 
"pri ce of experien ce" whi ch is dire ctly comparable to c T. Furthermore, 
it has a natural interpretation. Re call that k(p) is the expe cted 
value of an optimal policy once quality is known, given the observed 
pri ce is p. When quality is o bserved via actual consumption this value 
is not obtained for one period (since in this model the good lasts for 
pre cisely one period). Hen ce (1- S)k(p) is the gross opportunity cost 
of consuming the good given quality is unknown. But consumption of the 
good yields utility, in this case EU(p,Q). The net opportunity cost 
of consuming the good given quality is unknown is the difference between 
these two quantities. 
It is enormously useful to express the price of experien ce in 
this form. Analyti cally, it makes the comparison between B(p) and T (p) 
easier. Con ceptually, it helps identify factors whi ch might effe ct the 
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decision whether to o bserve quality before purchase or after pur chase. 
For example, suppose the cost of sear ch, c8, in creases. Then surely 
the value of an optimal policy will fall, i.e. av/a c8< 0. Equation (8) 
suggests that the price of experien ce will then fall as well. These 
and other results will be formalized in the following sections, First, 
however, a few more preliminary assumptions will be needed. 
Using the definition of cB(p) introdu ced above in equation (7), 
the fun ctional equation (1) can be rewritten as 
(9) 
The next step in characterizing an optimal poli cy is to compare V, 
k(p) - cB(p), and k(p) - cT. Unfortunately, without more stru cture on <jl,
and thus on �' any number of things can happen. Nelson recognized 
this pro blem as well, stating 
Prior to using [a] brand, all the consumer knows is its 
pri ce. But this knowledge provides only the roughest 
sort of guide to choi ce, for the consumer must assume a 
generally positive relationship between price and quality. 
In the absence of any other information, the consumer would 
not know if he were better off experimenting with low- or 
high-pri ced brands. [1970, p. 373). 
To get around this problem, Nelson converts the joint distribution 
of pri ce and quality to a distri bution of net utility and pro ceeds 
under the assumption that evaluation is always used to observe quality. 
In the present analysis, sin ce the de cision whether to observe quality 
before purchase or after purchase is endogenous, some formal stru cture 
must be pla ced directly on�. The standard assumption is that 
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a'l'(wjp)/op>O. This assumption implies that, on average, higher price 
is associated with lower utility even though higher price may well be 
associated with lower utility. Because this assumption is discussed at 
length in Wilde [1977), it will be assumed to hold here without further 
rationalization.5 
Several implications follow directly from the assumption 
that a'l'(wjp)/op>O. First, it implies the price of experience is 
increasing in the price of the good. To see this simply take the 
derivative of (8) with respect to p: 
V(l - fl) 
cB(p) = fa'l'(wjp)/'dp dw - 'l'(�(p) lp)z' (p)
z(p) 
V(l - fl) 
= f 'd'!'(wj p) /'dp dw
z(p) 
since 'l'(z(p)jp) =O by defin it ion. Second1 a'l'(wjp)/op>O implies that 
o bserving quality before purchase becomes a less desirable alternative 
to sampling again as the observed price increases, Th<l,t is1 using (6), 
z(p) 
T' (p) k I (p) -fa'!'(wjp)/ap dw::: O.
V(l - fl) 
Moreover, B'(p) = k1(p)-c�(p):5T1(p) as cB(p)=::O, whence observing 
quality after purchase also becomes a less desirable alternative to 
(10) 
sampling again as the observed price increases and it does so at an even 
faster rate than observing quality before purchase. 
This completes the preliminary analysis of the model. It 
turns out that three qualitatively distinct forms of the optimal 
policy are possi ble. If cT is low enough then inspection always 
dominates evaluation. If cT is somewhat higher then evaluation 
dominates inspection for one set of prices and inspection dominates 
evaluation for another set of prices, and if cT is high enough then 
evaluation always dominates inspection. These three cases are 
analyzed in the next three sections. 
3. THE OPTIMAL POLIC Y, C ASE A: INSPECTION ONLY 
In comparing the expected value of observing quality 
before purchase to the expected value of observing quality after 
purchase, the crucial variables are cB(p) and cT. It is clear that 
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But cB(p) is increasing in p so that c (0) > c implies cB(p) > cT for B - T -
all p =::: 0. Hence the expected value of o bserving quality before 
purchase will always be greater than the expected value of o bserving 
quality after purchase when cB(O) >cT. This is o bviously most likely 
to be the case when cB(O) is large and cT is small. Equation (8) 
suggests cB (0) is most likely to be large when V(l - fl) is signifi­
cantly greater than z(O). But V(l- fl) = U(O,q*(O)) and z(O) = U(O,O) • 
Hence cB(O) is most likely to be large when q*(O) is high. In other 
words, inspection is likely to dominate evaluation for all prices 
when the cost of inspection is low or when few quality levels are 
1 .
. 
· The latter might be the case, forac cepta ble even at ow pri ces. 
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example, when the cost of drawing observations from <jJ is low or the 
variation in utility due to quality is high relative to the variation
6 in utility due to price. 
In the remainder of this se ction it will be assumed that 
it will be assumed that 
V(l - S) f IJ.l<w l O)dw � 
z( O) 
This implies B(p) s T(p) for all p:::: O, in which case B(p) can be 
ignored completely; characterizing the optimal policy reduces to 
comparing T(p) and V. Two possi bilities arise. In the first there 
exists a unique finite pri ce, say p�, su ch that o bserving quality 
prior to purchase is optimal for p Sp� and sampling again is optimal 
for p:::: p� (see figure 1) . 
V = T (p*) .7 In the second V T 
The criti cal price is defined by 
is stri ctly less than T(p) for all 
. 1 8 p:::: O so that observing quality prior to purchase is always optima · 
and is finite. 
Assume for the remainder· of this se ction that P� exists 
Then p* and q* partition R x R+ into three sets T + 
(see figure 2). · > * so the good is reje cted outright. In region I, p PT 
In region I I, p s p� but q < q*(p) so that quality is observed prior 
to pur chase but the good is su bsequently reje cted (i.e., not pur­
chased). In regioniI I, pSp� and q::::q*(p) so that quality is observed 
prior to purchase and the good is subsequently ac cepted (i.e., 
pur chased). 
How do changes in cs and cT effe ct this partition? To
answer this question one needs to know how changes in cs and cT 
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effect p� and q*(p). The following results are straightforward, but
tedious, and can be found in appendix 1 of this paper. It is shown
there that 
dp* dp* ----1'. > 0 and ---1. < o. des dcT 
Of course V falls as either cs or CT rises. Since U(p, q* ( p)) V(l - S) 
by definition and U is in creasing in q, this implies 
and 
In other words, an in crease in the cost of drawing observations from 
<jJ will make inspe ction an optimal strategy for more pri ces while an 
increase in the cost of inspection will make inspe ction an optimal 
strategy for less pri ces. An increase in either cost will make 
more quality levels ac ceptable for any given price. 
Next, consider how changes in cs and cT effect the number 
of observations which must be drawn from <jJ (whether or not quality 
is inspe cted) before an ac ceptable good is found. Define 
and 
p� 
IS = f [1- G(q*(p) ip) ]f(p)dp
0 
P* T 
�G(q*(p) Jp)f(p)dp.
0 
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Here IF is the probability that a random price-quality combination 
will fall in region II and IS is the probability that a random price 
quality combination will fall in region III. It is shown in appendix 
1 that the following hold: 
and 
while 
and 
Consider first an increase in the cost of drawing o bserva-
tions from $. Since p� increases, inspection becomes an optimal 
strategy for more prices. Furthermore, since q*(p) decreases, more 
quality levels are acceptable for any given price. Hence the expected 
number of observations which must be drawn from $ before an accepta ble 
good is found (1/IS) falls. The effect of an increase in cs on IF 
is ambiguous, however, because the decrease in q*(p) counteracts the 
increase in p� rather than reinforcing it. 
Precisely the opposite happens when the cost of inspection 
increases. Since p� falls, inspection becomes an optimal strategy 
for less prices. Furthermore, since q*(p) still decreases, fewer 
quality levels are acceptable for any given price. Hence IF falls. 
Since the effect on IS is ambiguous, it is impossible to assert 
that an increase in the cost of inspection reduces the expected 
number of observations which must be drawn from $ before an accept-
able good is found. 
4. THE OPTIM AL P O LI C Y, C ASE B: INSPECTION AND EVA LUATI O N
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It was assumed throughout section 3 that cB (0) � cT so that 
inspection dominated evaluation for all prices. Recall that 
V(l - 8) 
CB (0) = !'¥ <w l O)dw.
z(O) 
It is immediate from this equation that acB(O)/acs< 0 and acB(O)/acT< 0 
since v is decreasing in either cost and 'I' (w I 0) > 0 for w close to z(O). 
Hence increases in either cs or cT make it less likely that cB (O) � cT. 
Assume for the remainder of this paper that cB (0) < cT. 
Then two possibilities arise. In the first, inspection is optimal 
for one set of prices and evaluation is optimal for another set of 
prices. In the second, inspection is never optimal. This section 
will analyze the first possibility and the next section will analyze 
the second possibility.9 
In order for inspection to be optimal for one set of prices 
and evaluation to be optimal for another set of prices two conditions 
must be met. Assuming cB (O) < cT, the first can be stated as follows. 
Condition 1: The cost of inspection must not be so 
great that evaluation dominates inspection for all 
prices. 
When condition 1 holds, since B'(p) :'.:' T'(p):'.:' O, there exists a finite 
price p�T such that evaluation dominates inspection for p :'.:' p�T and 
inspection dominates evaluation for p � p�T ' The critical price is 
defined by T(p�T) = B(ph) (see figure 3). 
Assuming·condition 1 holds, the second condition can be 
stated as follows. 
Condition 2: The expected return to search must be 
low enough that for some prices inspection dominates 
drawing another observation from ¢.
Condition 2 requires that for some p > p�T ' T(p) > V. However as in 
section 3, it might be that T(p) > V for all p "'. p�T· Assume this 
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isn't the case. Then there exists a finite price P¥ such that 
inspection is optimal for p E [p�T ' p�] and drawing another observation 
from ¢ is optimal for p °". p¥. Again, as in section 3, the critical
10 price is defined by T(p�) = V (see figure 3). 
Overall the situation dealt with in this section is the 
most interesting of the model since it shows that quality can be a 
search characteristic for some prices and an experience characteristic 
for other prices. That is, the configuration of utility, search 
costs, inspection costs, and the joint distribution of price and 
quality are such that inspection, evaluation, and drawing another 
observation from ¢ are all optimal strategies for various prices. 
In general, P¥• p�T ' and q* partition R+x R+ into five regions. As 
in section 3 of this paper, Region I includes prices for which 
rejecting the good outright is optimal. In region II, p* < p < p* but BT - T 
q < q*(p) so that quality is observed prior to purchase but the good 
is subsequently rejected and in region III, p* < p < p* but q °". q*(p) BT - T 
so that quality is observed prior to purchase and the good is 
subsequently accepted. There are two additional regions, though. 
In region IV, PS p�T and q < q* (p) so that the good is purchased with-
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out quality having been observed but is not repurchased. In region 
V, P :S P�T and q °". q*(p) so that the good is purchased without quality 
having been observed and is repurchased in all subsequent periods. 
Figure 4 illustrates these regions. 
How do changes in cs and cT effect this partition? As 
before, to answer this question we need to know how changes in cs 
and cT effect p�T ' P¥ and q*(p). The following results are derived 
in appendix 2. As in section 3, 
Also, 
Finally, 
and 
dp*
___'!. < o. dcT 
An increase in the cost of drawing observations from ¢ 
will increase the set of prices for which evaluation is an optimal 
strategy. Furthermore, it will increase the set of prices for which 
either inspection or evaluation is an optimal strategy. An increase 
in the cost of inspection will increase the set of prices for which 
evaluation is an optimal strategy, will decrease the set of prices 
for which inspection is an optimal strategy, and will decrease the 
set of prices for which either inspection or evaluation is an optimal 
strategy. Finally, an increase in either cs or cT will make more 
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;� 
qual ity levels acceptable at any g iven pr ice. 
It is aga in useful to consider how increases in cs and cT 
effect the proba b il ity a random pr ice-quantity comb ination w ill fall 
in any g iven reg ion. Def ine 
and 
Ph f [1- G(q*(p) jp) ]f(p)dp
0 
p�T 
J c(q*(p) jp)f(p)dp
0 
p* 
Is = J [r- G(q*(p) 1p)]f(p)dp
p�T 
p* T f G(q*(p) jp)f(p)dp.
Ph 
Here I,F' IS, EF and ES are the probab il ities a random pr ice -quality 
comb ination w ill fall in reg ion II, III, IV or V, respectively. It 
is shown in appendix 2 that the following hold. 
Furthermore, 
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F inally, 
Wh ile the major ity of these partial der ivatives are 
amb iguous in sign, a number of interesting observations can still be 
made. F irst, the proba b il ity that a random price-qual ity comb ination 
w ill be acceptable (whether qual ity is inspected or evaluated) is 
g iven by IS+ ES. Hence the expected number of observations needed 
to locate an acceptable good is 1/ (IS+ ES), As before, th is quantity 
is decreas ing in cs and amb iguous in cT. Second, both aES/acS > 0 
and aES/acT > 0. That is, the probab il ity that a random price­
qual ity comb ination w ill be purchased w ithout qual ity having been 
observed and subsequently repurchased is increasing in e ither cost. 
Th is is because when e ither cs or cT increases, the set of prices for 
wh ich evaluation is optimal increases and the set of qual ity levels 
wh ich are acceptable for any g iven pr ice also increases. However, 
th is necessarily impl ies aEF/acS and aEF/acT are amb iguous in sign. 
This last observation is important. When a pr ice-qual ity comb ination 
falls in reg ion IV the good is purchased w ithout qual ity hav ing been 
o bserved, but is not subsequently repurchased. Th is "brand d isloyalty" 
is analogous to a job-quit in the labor market or a d ivorce in the 
marr iage market. It is cruc ial to recogn ize that the l ikel ihood of 
these events does not appear to be systematically related to e ither 
search costs or inspection costs. Th is po int w ill be d iscussed in 
more deta il in section 6. 
5. THE OPTIMA L P O L I C Y, CASE C: EVALUAT I ON ONL Y
Suppose that cB ( O) < cT but that e ither cond ition 1 or
ll 
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cond ition 2 of section 4 does not hold. Then evaluation w ill always 
dominate inspection for any relevant price.12 As always, two further 
poss i b ilities ar ise. In the f irst there ex ists a unique f in ite price, 
p� such that evaluation is optimal for p s p� and draw ing another 
o bservation from � is optimal for p =:: p�. The cr itical pr ice is 
defined by B(p�) V (see f igure 5). In the second B(p) > V for all 
p =:: 0 so that evaluation is always optimal. 
Assume for the rema inder of th is section that p� ex ists and 
is f in ite,13 Then p� and q* partition R+x R+ into three reg ions. As
in sections 3 and 4, reg ion I includes pr ices for which rejecting the 
good outr ight is optimal. In region IV, p :': p� and q·< q*(p) so the 
good is purchased w ithout quality hav ing been o bserved and is 
subsequently rejected ( i.e, not repurchased). In reg ion V, p Sp� 
but q_:.q*(p) so the good is purchased w ithout qual ity hav ing been 
observed and is subsequently accepted ( i.e., repurchased). 
F igure 6 illustrates these reg ions. 
< 
Of course cT has no effect on th is partition s ince T(p) 
max{B(p),V } for all p':'.0. W ith respect to cs, the follow ing 
results are establ ished in append ix 3. 
and 
As one m ight expect, an increase in the cost of draw ing observations 
from � increases the set of pr ices for which evaluation is optimal. 
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In this case the expected number of o bservations which must 
be drawn from � before an acceptable good is found is g iven by l/E where s 
p* B 
ES = f [l - G(q*(p) ,p)]f(p)dp.
0 
Append ix 3 also shows that aES/acs > 0 so fewer observations from � are 
needed to find an acceptable good as cs r ises, Finally, define EF as 
P* 
EF = f c �q*(p) lp)f(p)dp,
0 
As in section 4, EF is the probab il ity that a random pr ice-qual ity 
comb ination w ill be purchased w ithout qual ity having been observed 
and subsequently rejected ( i.e., not repurchased). Append ix 3 shows 
aEF/acs � o.
6, APP L I C AT I ONS 
The model analyzed in th is paper has o bvious analogues in 
the labor market and the marr iage market, The product market has been 
used as the setting up to th is po int because much of the relevant 
l iterature deals w ith consumer behavior (e.g., Nelson [1970], W ilde 
[1977], L ippman and McCall [1979a], and Hey and McKenna [1979]}, 
However, many of the important qualitative impl ications of the model 
emerge more sharply in the labor market than in the product market. 
The labor market analogue concerns an unemployed worker 
searching for a job. This ind iv idual pays a search cost in order to 
sample vacancies, but only the wage rate is o bserved. Nonwage 
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character istics can be observed e ither by payi'ng an inspection cost 
or by tak ing the job. 
Two aspects of the labor market analogue are of pr imary 
interest, unemployment and the qu it rate. u nemployment is related to 
the expected duration of search. The qu it rate is related to the 
probab il ity that a job wh ich is accepted w ill subsequently be rejected. 
Suppose that the d istr ibutions of net util ity associated 
w ith jobs, cond itional on the wage rate, ar t h t' 11 d · e s oc as ica y ecreasing 
in the wage rate. Then in the most interesting case there w ill be 
a range of low wages for wh ich renew ing search is optimal, a range 
of intermed iate wages for wh ich inspection is optimal, and a range 
of h igh wages for wh ich evaluation is optimal (see section 4 above). 
The effects of an increase in information costs on the 
duration of search seem stra ightforward. An increase in the cost of 
search makes both inspection and evaluation more desirable alternatives, 
Hence the duration of search should fall. An increase in the cost 
of inspection w ill l ikely have amb iguous effects on the duration of 
search s ince it makes evaluation a more des irable alternative but 
it also makes inspection a less des irable alternative. 
The effects of an increase in information costs on the qu it 
rate are less o bv ious. The argument would seem to go as follows: A 
quit requ ires that two events occur: (1) a wage rate is observed for 
wh ich it is optimal to take the job w ithout observ ing its nonwage 
component f irst, and (2) the nonwage component turns out to be too 
low so that it is optimal to qu it and renew search once it is 
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observed. But, an increase in e ither search costs or inspection 
costs makes evaluation optimal for more wages. In particular, there 
are lower wages for which evaluation is now optimal. These jobs must 
have h igher nonwage components in order to be acceptable; i.e., for 
them the probab ility of turnover is h igher. Hence the overall 
proba b il ity of a qu it should increase as e ither cost increases. 
Unfortunately these heur istics are incomplete because 
ne ither cons iders the fact that an increase in e ither i 1 cs or cT w 1 
decrease the return to search, mak ing lower values of the nonwage 
component acceptable at any g iven wage. While th is re inforces the 
argument regarding the relationship between information costs and 
the duration of search, it weakens the argument regarding the 
relationsh ip between information costs and the qu it rate. In fact 
an increase in e ither cost could e ither increase or decrease the 
qu it rate.14 
To justify these assertions formally the model of section 
4 must be used. Cons ider f irst the duration of search. There are 
really two measures wh ich are of interest. First, ES+ IS g ives the 
probab il ity that a random pr ice-quality observation w ill ultimately 
be acceptable (regardless of how qual ity is o bserved). Second, 
EF +ES+ IS g ives the probab il ity that a random pr ice o bservation w ill 
cause search to cease (although perhaps only temporar ily). It was 
shown in section 4 that 
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and 
It is also the case that 
and 
Purchases of goods for which quality has not been observed are really 
part of the search process. Hence 1/ (ES+ IS), which might be called 
the "pure duration of search", is the proper expression for the expected 
duration of search. However, empirically it would often be impossible 
to differentiate between observations which fall in region IV and 
o bservations which fall in region V. In other words, the observed 
duration of search would often correspond to 1/ (EF +ES+ I8), which 
might be called the "effective duration of search." 
Similar problems arise with respect to turnover. In fact, 
there are three measures of turnover embedded in this model, one ex 
ante and two ex poste. The ex ante measure is simply EF; it gives the 
probability that a random price-quality observation will be purchased 
once and only once. One ex post measure is what might be called the 
"pure failure rate for evaluation," EF = EF/ (EF +ES); it gives the
conditional probability that a good will be rejected given that it is 
purchased without quality having been o bserved. However, empirically 
it would often be hard to differentiate between o bservations which 
fall in region I I I  and o bservations which fall in region V. Hence 
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the other ex post measure is what might be called the "effective 
failure rate for evaluation," �F = EF/ (EF +ES+ IS); it gives the 
conditional probability that a good will be rejected given that it 
is purchased (regardless of whether quality is observed before purchase 
or after purchase). It turns out that none of these measures is 
systematically related to either search costs or inspection costs 
(see Appendix 2). 
The third application of this theoretical framework is to 
the marriage market. The marriage market analogue concerns an unwed 
individual searching for a marriage partner. This individual pays a 
search cost in order to sample potential partners, but only some 
characteristics are observed. Other characteristics can be observed 
either by paying an inspection cost or by getting married. 
The aspect of the marriage market analogue which is of 
primary interest is dissolution. The most complete analysis of the 
relationship between information costs and probability of dissolution 
is provided by Becker, Landes and Michael [1977]. These authors 
consider two cases, one in which remarriage is impossible and one in 
which the remarriage market is identical to the marriage market. 
Consider first the case in which remarriage is impossible. 
When remarriage is impossible, the value of dissolution is a constant. 
In the model analyzed in this paper an analogous assumption is that 
the value of not repurchasing a good is a constant, say V. Then 
instead of ( 3), B(p) would be defined as 
B(p) E [U(p,Q)] + Bk(p) 
where 
( 3') 
k(p) = V G [q*(p) !Pl +_[u�p_'�) g(qjp)dq
q (p) 
and q*(p) is def ined by 
U(p,q*(p)) = V(l -13).
The defin ition of T(p) would remain as in (4). This mod if ication 
affects the comparative statics of the model in a straightforward 
way; for p:Sp�T' dq*(p)/dcs=O=dq*(p)/dcT. Hence as before,
and 
but now 
aEF and 
aEF -->0 -a->O. acs CT 
Furthermore, as before, 
" " a ES and 
aEF 
--<0 -->0acs acT 
but now 
a ES and 
aEF 
--<0 acT 
> O.acT 
However, it rema ins true, even when the value of not repurchas ing a 
good is constant, that ES and EF bear no systematic relationsh ip to 
information costs. 
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These results are, on the surface, consistent w ith those of 
Becker, Landes and M ichael. Those authors assert that because "the 
proba b il ity of enter ing a m ismatch" would be greater, "an increase 
in the cost of intens ive or extens ive search would increase the
proba b il ity of a d issolution" [1977, p. 1 150). 15 The defin ition of 
"probab il ity of a d issolution" these authors use to arr ive at th is 
theoretical conclus ion is apparently EF. The problem is that EF is
unobservable, it is iF wh ich is o bserved, and even when remarr iage 
is imposs i ble, there is no systematic relationship between �F and 
e ither cs or cT! 
The s ituation is even more d iff icult when the remarr iage 
market is identical to the marriage market. Here, just as in the 
labor market analogue, none of the partial der ivatives relating 
information costs to turnover can be s igned. 
7. C ON C LUSI ON
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This paper has establ ished a number of strong results wh ich 
go against the gra in of the extant l iterature. These results obta in 
because goods are v iewed as multi-character istic composites in wh ich 
indiv idual character istics have specific informational properties. 
Under these c ircumstances consumers have an incentive to pursue very 
complicated information acqu is ition strateg ies. In order to analyze 
th is poss ibl ity, I have assumed that consumers are quite sophisticated. 
It m ight be objected, however, that actual consumers do not use 
optim iz ing strateg ies as compl icated as those stud ied in this paper. 
Rather, consumers use var ious satisf ic ing strateg ies. There is much 
to be sa id for th is po int of v iew, but satisf ic ing strateg ies are even 
less well understood than optim iz ing strateg ies. Furthermore, most 
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emp ir ical work on the duration of search and turnover is based, 
impl ic itly or explicitly, on s impler vers ions of the optim iz ing model 
developed in this paper (e.g., Becker, Landes, and M ichael [1977]), 
Thus, if my character ization of goods is accurate, resolution of the 
optim iz ing versus satisf ic ing controversy is more important than is 
commonly supposed. 
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FO OTN OTES 
1. This paper is a substantially revised vers ion of "More on
Inspection and Evaluation in Product Markets, " unpubl ished
manuscript, California Institute of Technology, 1978. I would
l ike to thank Steve L ippman and Alan Schwartz for very helpful
comments on an earl ier draft.
2. The formal analys is in th is paper w ill be set in the product
market. In th is case turnover is a nonrepeat sale, Section
6 w ill d iscuss applications to the labor market and the
marr iage market. In the labor market turnover is a qu it and
in the marriage market turnover is a d ivorce.
3. S ince aU(p,q)/aq > O, q*{p) w ill be unique w ith q :-". q*(p) an
acceptable quality level and q< q*{p) an unacceptable qual ity
level.
4. Existence of a bounded solution to (1) is stra ightforward.
Un iqueness can be established along trad itional lines if search
and inspection are not assumed to be timeless (see W ilde [1979])
or by appeal ing to MacQueen and M iller [19 60] if the support
of ¢ is assumed to be compact. More recently, Rob b ins [1970]
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shows that under the other assumptions of this paper, EU(P,Q)<00 
is sufficient for uniqueness. 
5. Even in the case where cT is infinite, some formal structure must
be placed on IJ'. See Wilde [1977] or Hey and McKenna [1979] for
more details.
6. There is no guarantee that cB (p) > O. In particular, it might
be the case that cB( O) = O. It can be shown, however, that
there exists E: > 0 such that cB (0) > 0 if cs < E: • 
7. Since a'l'(w lp)/ap> O  only implies T1(p)SO, it is possible that
the equation T (p) = V does not have a unique solution. However,
in this case {p jT(p)=V}= [p�,00) where p � = inf {p jT(p)=V}, so
that p � defined in this fashion satisfies the formal requirements 
stated in the text. 
8. Formal proofs of these assertions have been omitted since they
are trivial. It is immediate, however, that since cB( O) ::>:O, 
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set of prices. There seems to be little value in making these 
more formal. 
10. Again, since a'l'(w jp)/ap>O only implies B1(p)SO, the solution
to the equation T(p) = B(p) may not be unique. In this case 
· {p I T(p) = B(p)} = [p�T' 00) where p�T = inf {p jT(p) = B(p)}, so that
p�T defined in this fashion satisfies the formal requirements 
stated in the text.
11. This will certainly be the case when cT is large enough since
U is bounded. 
12. That is, B(p) ::>:T(p) for any p such that V<max { B(p), T(p)}.
13. Define p� = inf {p I B (p) = V}. Then if p� is not unique
{p j B(p) = v}= [p�,00), so that p� defined in this fashion satisfies
the formal requirements stated in the text.
14. See Lippman and McCall [1979b] for an extensive discussion of
there is always a small enough value of cT(possible 0) such these points in a related model.
that B(p) S T(p) for all p ::>: 0. 
9. Again, formal proofs that ranges of cs and cT exist such that
both possi bilities occur have been omitted. The text following 
identifies two necessary conditions for inspection to be optimal 
for one set of prices and evaluation to be optimal for another 
15. Intensive search corresponds to inspection and extensive search
corresponds to drawing another observation from �.  Hence the
cost of intensive search is cT and the cost of extensive search
is cs.
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APPENDIX 1 
This appendix analyzes the partial derivatives presented 
in section 3. In that section it was assumed that cB( O):O:cT so that 
T(p) ':': B(p) for all p ':': O. Hence the functional equation (1) can be 
written as 
V(p) -cs+ max{T(p),V}. 
Taking the expectation on both sides with respect to f(p), we get 
or 
* . 
v ; -cs +·��p)f(p)dp + �.:;f(p)dp
0 p� 
p* 
0 }T�p) - V]f(p)dp - cs · 
0 
Furthermore T(p�) -V; 0. Define 
and 
p* 
h(p�,V,cS, cT);  frTT(p) -V]f(p)dp -cs
0 
Taking the derivatives of h and i with respect to cs we get 
[��] 
But using T(p) ; k(p) -cT we have the following: 
Hence 
ah/ap* ; o T 
p* 
ah/av; Jr'¥T(v(1- S) I P) -lJf(p)qp < o
0 
ah /acs -1 < o 
Appendix - 2 
and 
dV 1
des 
= h2 
Hence dp;/dcs > 0 and dV/dcS <O. 
Similarly 
where 
Thus 
and 
ai/ac = -1<0. . T 
Appendix - 3 
1 
h "2 
and dV/dcT < O. 
Appendix - 4 
Now consider IS and IF. Recall 
Hence 
But 
so 
p; �p; . 
Is= 1[1- G(q*(p),p)J.f(p)dp = jr1-'1'(V(l-f3)ip)]f(p)dp. 
0 0 
p*aIF dpf * T dV -a - = 'l'(V(l - B)lp*)f(Pr*)-d- + ijJ(V(l -f3) IP�(l - f3)-a f(p)dp. cs T cs cs 0 
Thus aIS/acs > O but aIF/acs cannot be signed. Similarly, 
P* dp* 
(-
T dV [l-'l'(V(l-f3) IP*)]f(p*)__1'. + -�J(V(l-f3) ip)(l-f3)-f(p)dp T T dcT _0 
dcT 
and 
dp*
'l'(V(l - S)J p*)f(p*)----1:_ T T dcT
Appendix - 5 
p* l T dV + J!(V(l-B)Jp)(l-B)dcT f(p)dp.0 
Thus aIF/acT < O but aIS/acT cannot be signed. Finally, recall 
A Is= Is/F(p�) so thai: 
Similarly 
(ais/acs)F(p�) - Isf(p�)(dp�/dcs) 
F(p�)2 
P* 
d * (, T 
{f(p�)d:: J ['l'(V(l-B) Jp) 0 
- 'l'(V(l-B)Jp�)]f(p)dp 
p* 
- h;V(l- f3)Jp)(l-B)ddcVS f(p)dp • F(pp}. 
dp*
l
p� 
F(pT*)
-2
• {f (p*)� ['l'(V(l -B) Jp) - 'l'(V(l -B) Ip�) ]f (p)dpT CT 0 
p* 
I
T dV - 'P(V(l -B) J p) (1 -B) dcT f (p)dp • F(p�)} • 0 
Since a'l'(wJp)/ap > O, aIS/acS is ambiguous in sign but aIS/acT > 0, 
Furthermore IF= 1 - ts so aIF/acs is ambiguous in sign but arF/acT < 0. 
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APPENDIX 2 
This appendix analyzes the partial derivatives presented 
in section 4,  In that section it is assumed that cB( O)< cT but 
T(p) > V for some p such that B(p) < T(p) so that both evaluation and 
inspection are optimal strategies for some prices, Here 
or 
v 
[
Ph 
J
P� 
0 [ B(p) -V]f(p)dp + [T(p) -V]f(p)dp - cS ,
0 Ph 
Furthermore T(p�) -V = 0 and T(p�T) - B(ph) = 0. 
Define 
and 
p�T p� f [ B(p) -V]f(p)dp + fT(p) -V]f(p)dp - cs
0 p�T 
Taking the derivatives of h, i, and j with respect to cs we get 
where 
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h3] [dp�/dc8 ]
i3 dph/dc8 
j3 dV/dc8 [:] 4 
h2 0 
1:!�-l]f(p)dp + f;��-l]f(p)dp < 0
0 * . PBT 
0 
ak 
a v- 1 = 'l'(V(l-f3)jp�)-l < O 
0 
0 
V(l - f3) 
T'(ph) - B'(p�T) = f a'l'(wjp)/ap dw > o
ak _ f3 aka v a v
z (p) 
(1- f3)'1'(V(l - f3) IP�T) > 0 
(*) 
Hence the system (*) can be written 
[
:
l 
0 h' ] r�/dos 
l0 i3 dph/dc8 
j2 j3 dV/dc8 
Inverting the matrix yields 
[ <lp�/dosl 
d�T/dc8 
dV/dc8 
Thus 
[-J,
1
, 
1 . .  y; -l1J3 
ilj2 
j2h
3 
0
0 
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[:] 
,
:
:,] 
[]
Similarly 
so that 
I
p� 
aT -f(p)dp = 
* acT PBT 
-1 < 0 
� = -1 <O , acT 
dp� i3h5 + h3 
dcT h3i1 
dpJh h5 j3 + h3 
dcT h . 3J2 
dV -h5
dcT t;-
Appendix - 9 
0 1 
0 1 
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Now 
p�T p� 
+ J[B'l'(V(l - f3) IP) - l]f(p)dp + fi'l'(V(l - f3) IP) -l]f(p)dp
0 p�T 
p�T p� 
k f3'l'(V(l - f3) Ip)-l]f(p)dp + J['l'(V(l - f3) IP) -'l'(V(l- 8) IP�)]f(p)dp.
P�T 
Therefore, since a'l'(wlp)/ap > 0, i3h3 + h3< 0. Thus dp�/dcT< 0. Furthermore 
dp�T/dcT > 0 and dV/dcT < 0. 
Hence 
and 
so that 
Now, consider ES' EF' IS and IF. Recall 
p�T p�T 
Es = f [l- G(q*(p)lp)]f(p)dp = fr1-'l'(V(l- f3)lp)]f(p)dp.
0 . 0 
p�T 
. dph J dV [1-'l'(V(l- B) IP�T)]f(p�T) dcs + -1jl(V(l- f3)ip)(l- f3)dcs f(p)dp0 
p�T p�T 
EF LG(q*(p) lp)f(p)dp = l¥(V(l - f3) lp)f(p)dp
Appendix - 11 
p�T 
+ Jw< v(l- f3)Jp)(l- f3)d
d;
s
f(p)dp. 
0 
Thus aES/acs > O but aEF/acs cannot be signed. Next, recall 
Hence 
and 
p� p� 
f1 - G(q*(p)Jp)]f(p)dp = fi1-'¥(V(l- f3)Jp)]f(p)dp. 
Ph p�T 
dp* dp�T [l - '¥(V(l - f3) Jp*)]f(p*)_'!'_- [1 - '¥(V(l: -f3)Jp* )]f (p* )--T T des B T B T des 
p* T 
+ J-1)!(V(l- f3)Jp)(l - f3)d:
v
s 
f(p)dp,
p�T 
P* p* 
IF = Jc!q*(p) Jp)f(p)dp = 
f 
'¥(�(1 - f3) Jp)f(p)dp
p�T p�T 
so that 
dp* dp�T 'l'(V(l - f3) Jp*)f(p*)_'!'_ - 'l'(V(l- f3) IP* )f(p* )--T T des B T B T  des 
p* 
+ Jw
:
v <1 -B)lp)(l - f3):;s f(p)dp.
p�T 
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Thus neither ar /ac nor al /ac can be signed. Similarly, S S F S 
and 
A 
P* 
dp* B T  
[l-'¥(V(l- f3)Jp�T)Jf(ph) dc
B
: + fw(V(l- f3) Jp)(l-f3) :c
v f(p)dp,
0 T 
P* 
dp* f B T  
'¥(V(l- f3) Jp�T)f(ph) d:T
T + lj!(V(l-f3)Jp)(l - f3)d
d
c
V f(p)dp,
0 T 
dp* dp* 
[l - '¥(V(l- f3)Jp*)]f(p*)_'!'_ - [l-'¥(V(l- f3)Jp* )]f(p* )__IITT T dc T B T B T  dc T 
dp*
'l'(V(l - f3) IP*)f(p*)_'!'_T T de T 
p* T 
+ flj!(V(l- f3) Jp)(l- f3)d:: f(p)dp,
dp* 
'l'(V(l-f3) IP* )f(p* )__IITB T B T  dc T 
p* 
+ Jw�v(1 - f3) Jp)(l -B):c: f(p)dp.
p;'l' 
Recall E = E / F(p* ) Hence S S B T  ' 
aEs (aEs/acs)F(ph) - Es f(p�T) (dp�T/dc8)
acs F(p�T)
2 
Similarly, 
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p�T 
+ Jwcvc1-s) IP)C 1-s)d:: f(p)dp • FC p�T)}. 
0 
P* 
d * BT PBT J f(ph) dcT ['l'(V(l- S)ip)-'l'(V(l- S)iph)]f(p)dp0 
Again a'l'Cwl p)/ap>O, so that aE S/acs>O. But aE S/acT is ambiguous in 
sign. Furthermore, EF = 1-E s so aEF/acs < 0 but a:EF/acT is ambiguous 
in sign. And, at last, we have 
dp* dp�T (ars/acs)[F(p�) -F(ph)J - rs[ f(p�)ac! - f( ph)rc;]
[F(p�) - F(ph)) 2 
- 'l'(V(l- S)iPh)]f(p)dp 
p* 
J 
T dV - [F(p�) - F(p�T)] 'l' (V(l- S)ip)(l - S)dcs 
f(p)dp}
p�T 
Similarly, 
Appendix - 14 
P*
d * T 
[F(p*) -F(p* ) ]- {f(p*)- ['l'(V(l - S) IP) -2 
PTf 
T BT T dcT 
'l'(V(l - S) IPP ]f(p)dp 
Ph 
- 'l'(V(l - S) IP�T)]f(p)dp 
P* 
J T dV - [F(p�) - F(ph)J 'l'(V(l - S)i p)(l- S)dcT f(p)dp}
p�T 
Alas, none of these partial derivatives can be signed either, 
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APPENDIX 3 
This appendix analyzes the partial derivatives presented 
in section 5. In that section it is assumed that cB(O)<cT but 
T(p) < V for all p such that B(p) < T(p). Here 
p* 
0 = f [!(p) -V]f(p)dp.
0 
Furthermore, B(p�) = T. Define 
and 
P* 
h(p�, V, cs, cT) I[ B�p) - V]f(p)dp
0 
Taking the derivatives of h and i with respect to cs, 
But using B(p) = k(p) - cB(p), 
0 
p* 
I [�(V(l - B) I P) -l]f(p)dp< 0
0 
Hence 
where /I, = -i1 h2. Thus 
-1 
1 
h2 
dp� d Hence --· > 0 and _y_ < 0. des des 
dp� Since T(p) is irrelevant in this case, a--­cT 
Now consider ES and EF. Recall 
O = dVdcT
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p* p* 
I[�- G(q*(p) jp)]f(p)dp = fr/-'¥(V(l - f3) jp)f(p)dp.
0 0 
Hence 
But 
so 
so 
p* 
d * B 
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PB r: dV [l-ljl(V(l-13)lp�)]f(p�)dcs,- j�(V(l-13)lp)(l-13)d cs f(p)dp.0 
P* B P* B 
J G(q*(p) l'p)f(p)dp
0 
I\jl(V(l-13) lp)f(p)dp
0 
dp* 
ljl(V(l -13) IP*)f(p*)2B B des
p* B 
+ 11/J(V(l-13)jp)(l-13)ddcVS f(p)dp ,0 
(aEs/a cs) F(p�) - Es f(p�) (dp�/d cs) 
F(p�)2 
p* 
d * fr B PB f (p�) des [ljl(V(l -13) Ip) - \jl (V(l -13) Ip�) ]f (p)dp0 
p* f B dV - 1/J(V(l -13)lp)(l- f3)d cs f(p)dp0 
Since a\jl(wjp)/ap > O, aES/a cS is ambiguous in sign. 
0 
q 
0 
p* T 
p* T 
---T(p) 
Figure 1 :  Definition of p� 
_.,...--
q*(p) 
I 
p 
Figure 2: Price-quality combinations, Case A: I= reject outright,
II= inspect and subsequently reject, III = inspect and 
su bsequently ac cept. 
0 
q 
0 
Figure 4:
p�T P* T 
Figure 3: Definition of p�T and Pf
Ph
/ 
P* T 
/ 
/ 
/ / 
/q*(p) 
I 
v 
T(p) 
Price-quality combinations, Case B: I= reject outright 
II= inspect and ultimately reject, III= inspect and 
'
ultimately accept, IV= purchase once and only once, 
V =purchase once and forever more. 
q 
p* B 
p* B 
Figure 6: 
Figure 5: Definition of p�
-------- q*(p)
I 
T(p) 
B(p) 
p
-- p 
Price-quality combinations; Case C: I= reject outright,
IV= purchase once and only once, V = purchase once and 
forever more. 
